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Abstract 
“Release early, release often” is becoming a popular new product introduction strategy in open 
source software development. We study the influence of release strategies on the download market 
share of open source projects. Using a panel data set collected from Sourceforge.net, we find that 
while more frequent releases are associated with better subsequent download market share, the 
relationship is curvilinear. Too frequent releases could backfire due to the subtle effects on the 
demand and supply sides of open source software production. From the demand side, we find that 
releasing frequently may work less effectively in projects with higher adoption costs. From the supply 
side, fast releases may work less effectively in projects with weak community contributions. Even when 
the community contributions are strong, the restrictiveness of open source license moderates the 
effectiveness of releasing early and often. These results have implications for managing open source 
projects and research on open source software, open innovation, and software adoption. 
Keywords: Open Source Software, Community Contribution, License, Adoption Cost, Download. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Open source software (OSS) has become an important approach to organize software development in 
the past decade, and is continuously transforming the software industry (The Economist 2009). OSS 
differs from traditional proprietary software by distributing the source code openly (at no or very little 
cost), and allowing others to modify or enhance it (OSI 2011). In a typical OSS project, a single 
developer or a small team start an OSS project, which then grows as it attracts community 
contributions (Setia et al. 2012).  Incorporating these contributions, the team distributes the software 
through online channels such as Sourceforge.net (SF). Users download the software under one of 
various types of license arrangements that govern how the software can be subsequently developed 
and monetized. Some of the users may join the co-creation of OSS production by reporting bugs or 
even writing patches for the project. 
The co-creation in OSS does not always unfold smoothly. Fogel (2005) estimates that 90% to 95% of 
the OSS projects fail, which means they attract no attentions or the developers stop working on it.  
Chengalur-Smith and Sidorova (2003) find that about 80% of projects on Sourceforge.net (SF) have 
no activity at all. To fully understand the social mechanisms behind OSS, the motivations and 
governance of OSS stands out as important research topics (Von Krogh and Von Hippel 2006). While 
empirical studies identify project characteristics affecting OSS success (Grewal et al. 2006; e.g. 
Stewart et al. 2006; Subramaniam et al. 2009), the OSS production process and its social environment 
are usually ignored (Singh et al. 2011). Our study considers OSS projects in a competitive context and 
examine one crucial factor that a project development team can control: the release strategy, which 
refers to the release frequency and quality improvements by the OSS teams. We also study the 
influence of factors such as community contributions, OSS licenses and product adoption cost in 
shaping the release strategy. 
Raymond (1999) argues that an OSS project should “release early, release often” to produce software 
with higher quality, which helps the project succeed under competition. Over the years, this has been 
accepted as a common belief in OSS development. However, there has been no empirical study testing 
this approach. In this study, we investigate the relationship between release strategy and project 
success. which is normally defined with user interest and developer interest (Grewal et al. 2006; e.g. 
Stewart et al. 2006; Subramaniam et al. 2009). We focus specifically on the user interest, which refers 
to the download market share of a project.  
Motivated by the issues identified above, we seek to study the following research questions: (1) How 
would release frequency in OSS projects affect their success? Is it true that more frequent release is 
better? (2) How do factors like adoption cost and community contributions impact the release 
strategy? (3) What is the effect of OSS license in this process? To address these questions, we first 
develop a theoretical framework which specifies release strategy as a factor associated with the 
success of OSS projects, with other project attributes as control or moderate variables. We then test the 
model using a panel data set of 1092 projects in 15 categories from SF. Our data analysis identifies 
release strategy as an important factor that is associated with market share of OSS projects, and 
reveals other variables that affect the community-enabled product development and release process. 
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
We view the OSS development as a co-creation process of the OSS team and the community, which 
von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) call a “Private-Collective” innovation model. This is unique to open 
source software in contrast to traditional proprietary software development. We investigate the co-
creation process through one factor that the team could control – the release strategy, and other 
variables of the production process, the community contributions and the software license types. 
Several important questions have been asked in the OSS literature. First, why do people contribute to 
OSS for free? Developers contribute to OSS projects mainly with two types of motivations: intrinsic 
(e.g. altruism, reciprocity, and hobbies) and extrinsic (e.g. reputation, signaling, learning, and self-
need) (Lakhani and Wolf 2007; Roberts et al. 2006). However, utilizing the motivations does not 
necessarily lead to success of OSS projects, because most of normal users do not know the effort of 
developers unless they can see and use the product. Seeking to bridge this gap, we propose to examine 
release strategy as an important but missing linkage between motivations and success of OSS. Second, 
in considering the competition with proprietary software, studies have asked when software should go 
open source and which license should a project choose (August et al. 2009; Lerner and Tirole 2005). 
However, projects sometimes have to follow certain license or are affected by social influence (Singh 
and Phelps 2012). For example, the GNU General Public License (GPL) requires that any derived 
work should open their source code under GPL. In this paper, we investigate the effect of release 
strategy on the download market share given the software license of the project. 
From the software adoption perspective, the users choose among competing OSS projects by 
comparing the utilities they could obtain from the products. Since OSS is normally distributed for free, 
quality of OSS becomes an important determinant of project success. In this study, we draw on related 
literature to formulate our hypotheses. Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework we developed for  
this study. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Release Strategy 
How and why would releasing early and often help an OSS project in its download market share? 
First, a project can deliver quality improvement quickly to users with frequent  releases. Research on 
software releasing shows that due to the fixed cost nature of investment in patching, a software may 
release a buggier product early and patch it later in a larger market (Arora et al. 2006; Ji et al. 2005). 
Second, OSS projects rely heavily on community contributions. A faster release frequency may attract 
more community contributions, which help improve the quality of the software. Faster release 
frequency would also reward the contributors by incorporating their suggestions (Raymond 1999). 
Lastly, higher release frequency may signal energy and  momentum in development and can give users 
more confidence in adopting the software. It is argued in the literature that under-provision of 
introductory quality (release early) could signal high externality, and upgrades could serve as the 
mechanism to implement the signaling strategy (Padmanabhan et al. 1997). With the above logic, we 
conjecture that:  
H1A: Higher release frequency is associated with larger subsequent download market share. 
However, there may be a down side with high release frequency. First, there are always costs 
associated with software adoption, both in the case of users upgrading and switching software. When a 
project releases too fast but does not deliver enough quality improvements, customers may hold back 
by weighing the benefit and cost of upgrading. Therefore, customers may be more likely to hold back 
when the adoption cost is high. Second, releasing a large number of versions in a short time period 
may exaust the team and community and create version fragmentation and overload. The project may 
have to maintain a lot of versions, which creates additional burden for the project to absorb the 
contributions and makes it hard for the community to keep up with the speed. Therefore, we expect the 
release frequency to have a curvilinear relationship (inverse U-shape) with subsequent download 
market share.  
H1B: Release frequency has a curvilinear relationship with subsequent download market share. 
Users will natually weigh the benefit and cost of adopting the new versions. Even though most of the 
OSS products are distributed for free, there are costs associated with adoption anyway. Whether the 
user is installing or updating, it takes time and effort to implement and learn the new versions, 
especially for software that affects a whole organization. If the release  is of limited scope and contains 
only a few small bug fixes, the upgrade cost would exceed the benefit and users could choose to wait 
until the next release. Therefore, the adoption cost may outweigh the benefit from adopting the new 
version. This leads to our next hypothesis: 
H1C: The positive effect of release frequency on download market share is lower in projects with 
higher adoption cost. 
2.2 Community Contributions 
We now investigate the supply side of OSS production. If a project has unlimited resources, it could 
definitely improve the quality by fast and frequent releases. However, projects seldom have unlimited 
resources, and most OSS projects have a small core development team (Raymond 1999). Even if the 
OSS project is backed up by a big company, the firm has to evaluate the investments carefully since it 
is difficult to sell the software product directly. Moreover, adding developers to the project may have 
diminishing marginal productivity boosting effect (Brooks 1995). On the other hand, there is a whole 
community working voluntarily for the project, though the team often has no control over the features 
and bugs that volunteers want to work on (Michlmayr et al. 2007). But they do have control over the 
release plan for new versions. Our second research question thus is: Given the contributions of the 
community, what release strategy should an OSS project choose?  
The importance of contributions from the community (either individuals or firms) has been recognized 
in OSS studies (e.g. Grewal et al. 2006; e.g. Lerner et al. 2006). Raymond (1999) argues that the OSS 
community could help in rapid improvement and effective debugging.  von Krogh et al. (2003) 
analyze the innovation process of Freenet and discuss the community joining and specializing of open 
source community. von Hippel (2001) use OSS as an important example of innovation by user 
community. Following West and Lakhani (2008), we define the community of an OSS project as a 
voluntary association of users and developers without prior common organizational affiliation but 
united by creating and adopting the OSS program. That is, we define the community contributions as 
the work emerged from those users and developers outside the OSS team. Given the benefits brought 
by community contributions, we expect that the impact of a certain release is bigger when the 
community contributions are higher controlling the quality improvement effort by the team.  
H2: Effect of release frequency on subsequent download market share is higher when the community 
contributions are greater. 
2.3 OSS Licenses 
OSS projects use open source license schemes to maintain their openness, which refers to free access, 
free distribution, and free modification of the source code (OSI 2011; Zhu & Zhou 2012). Though all 
OSS licenses follow the Open Source Initiative (OSI) definition, they vary in their relative 
restrictiveness, based on whether the derivative works should follow the same license (e.g. GPL) and 
whether to allow the mixing of open and closed source software (e.g. GNU Lesser General Public 
License, LGPL) (Lerner and Tirole 2005). A highly restrictive license such as GPL requires the 
derived works (even if they just use the project instead of modifying it) to follow the same license.  A 
less restrictive license (e.g. Berkeley Software Distribution, BSD) is less restrictive in the sense that 
the community contributors have less limitations in using or modifying the work. Regarding the 
determinants and consequences of OSS licenses, Lerner and Tirole (2005) suggest that restrictive 
licenses protect the project from “hijacking” by commercial software firms, which means the firm may 
add some proprietary code to the project and hijack it with an open source approach. Colazo and Fang 
(2009) find that restrictive licenses are associated with more developers, higher coding activity, and 
faster project speed. Stewart et al. (2006) argue that restrictive licenses keep the visibility of the 
developer’s contributions and remain the customizability of the source code (so they don't need to pay 
for the software that comes from their own efforts). Belenzon and Schankerman (2008) find that 
developers are strongly sorted by the license type. Summarizing these studies in OSS literature, 
restrictive license could (a) promise customizability; (b) protect from hijacking; (c) sustains visibility; 
and (d) encourage identification.  
Even though some authors argue that license would affect download (Stewart et al. 2006), we view it 
as a device to coordinate the efforts of the team and the community. Therefore, it should work through 
the community contributions. Because restrictive licenses are likely to attract better developer 
contributions, the effect of community contributions in restrictive projects may be higher. Thus release 
faster may help improve the quality of the project faster, and enhance its competition with other 
projects. 
H3: The moderate effect of community contributions is higher in projects with restrictive licenses. 
2.4 Network Effects and Product Diffusion 
Besides the effect of release strategies, we expect that some other variables also have an influence on 
the market share of OSS projects. Two important factor that will affect the adoption of OSS project are 
network effects and product diffusion. Network effects indicate that the value of a product increases 
with the size of the network. It has been documented in many technology adoption studies (Kauffman 
et al. 2000; Zhu et al. 2006). The product diffusion literature finds that consumer adoption is 
influenced by the current user base and the number of potential users (e.g. Bass 1969). There are two 
diffusion processes in our context of OSS. One process happens on the category level. The users of a 
certain category of software may be increasing or shrinking. We control this by doing our analysis in 
each category. Another process happens on each product. As the quality of various software differs, 
the market share will increase or decrease accordingly. We will control this by decomposing the 
product diffusion effect into product fixed effect and its age. We control the network effect and 
product diffusion following Duan et al. (2009). The details will be provided in Section 4. 
3 DATA AND METHODS 
We gather the data of this study from SourceForge (SF), which is a major platform for OSS 
development, distribution and maintenance since 1999. It has been an important source of data for 
OSS studies (Belenzon and Schankerman 2008; Grewal et al. 2006; Lerner and Tirole 2005; Singh et 
al. 2011). 
We developed a Java program to collect all the project and release information on SF. The data was 
collected in Nov, 2010. There were more than 157,720 projects hosted on SF at that time, about 
80,000 of which have more than one download. We collected the release information of relatively 
popular projects with more cumulative download than the average download (27,804) at the time. Our 
sample contains 3995 OSS projects. We then constructed an unbalanced monthly panel for all the 
projects, and downloaded all the related data such as download, bug reports, patches contributions etc. 
in each month. The key variables and their descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  
 
Variable Description and Measure Mean  Std. Dev 
_ jtlog mktshare  log transformed market share -6.30 2.03 
jtreleases  number of releases 0.25 1.17 
2 jtreleases  squared term of number of releases  1.42 89.54 
_ jtbug fixed  number of bug fixes since last release  0.98 3.58 
jtcomm  sum of bugs reported and patches since last release 6.08 13.17 
_ jtstrong comm  
dummy variable, whether comm is above the mean in 
the category. 0.27 0.44 
_ jtweak comm  dummy variable, whether comm is below the mean in the category. 0.73 0.44 
_ jhighly restrictive  dummy variable, whether project j has a highly restrictive license 0.62 0.48 
_ jless restrictive  dummy variable for whether project j has a highly restrictive license 0.38 0.48 
_ jhigh cost  dummy variable for whether project j is in a high upgrading/switching cost category 0.69 0.46 
juser_oriented  dummy variable for whether project j is user-oriented 0.47 0.50 
jtlog_cu  log transformed number of cumulative download 10.33 2.50 
jtage  days since the project registered on SF  1498.56 949.70 
2 jtage  days since the project registered on SF squared  3147612.42 3293006.15 
Subscripts j stands for project j, t stands for month t. 
Table 1.  Key Variables and Summary Statistics 
We classify the restrictiveness of OSS licenses following the literature (Belenzon and Schankerman 
2008; Lerner and Tirole 2005). We construct a variable highly_restrictivej to indicate whether project j 
has a highly restrictive license such as GPL.  
To calculate the market share of each project, we followed Duan et al. (2009) to define the market of 
an OSS project as the category it is listed in. We then choose the 15 most popular categories in our 
data1. For those projects that are listed in multiple categories, we choose the category that has the 
largest number of projects in it. Including market share as a dependent variable has several 
advantages. First, it removes unobservable influences such as weekend and holiday effects (Duan et al. 
2009). Second, it controls for the trend of the whole category. Third, it addresses to a certain extent the 
concern of new installs and upgrades.  
                                                    
1
 These contains projects from categories of Games/Entertainment, Editors, File Sharing, Chat, Software Development, 
Integrated Development Environments (IDE), Systems Administration, Security, Firewalls, Database, Database 
Engines/Servers, Enterprise, Accounting, ERP, CRM. 
We create a dummy variable jcost  to represent the adoption cost of project j according to our 
classification2. We also use the audience of the projects as an indicator of adoption cost to confirm the 
result. End-user oriented programs usually have lower adoption costs than projects for developers and 
system administrators. 
Since not all projects on SF use the tracker system (e.g. bug reports, patches, and feature requests, etc.) 
provided by SF, we use only projects that have those systems on SF. Our sample ended up containing 
1092 projects from 15 categories.  
As suggested by our conceptual framework, we are interested in the consequence of releases strategy 
of OSS projects. Technically, our estimation model is 
jt j jt jt jtlog_mktshare X Zα β γ ε= + + +  (1) 
where jtZ  is a vector of control variables. Here we control for the network effect and product 
diffusion by adding the cumulative downloads, age of the project, and age-squared in jtZ .  
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Effect of Release Strategy 
We examine how release strategy relates to the download market share of OSS projects. The results 
are shown in Table 2, and the model-fit indices are shown in the bottom rows. With the effect of the 
fixed effect excluded, the dependent variables have 2R  of 39%, which is deemed acceptable. We then 
proceed to test each hypothesis by examining the magnitude and significance of the coefficients.  
In Model (1), we test the effect of release frequency on download market shares while controlling the 
quality improvement efforts since last release (bug_fixedjt). We find that release frequency is 
positively associated ( p<0.01) with subsequent download market share, which supports our H1A. The 
significant negative coefficient (p<0.01) of releases2jt supports our H1B that there exists a curvilinear 
relationship between release frequency and subsequent download market share. Coefficients of 
releasesjt×high_costj (relXcost)  and releasesjt×userj (relXuser) in model (2) and (3) support our H1C 
in that when adoption cost is high, the effect of release frequency decreases. Note that the dummy 
userj  stands for enduser-oriented projects, which usually have lower adoption costs than software 
targeting developers or system administrators. The opposite signs of the coefficients of the two 
confirm our H1C.  
 
 
_ jtlog mktshare  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
L.releases .095*** .15*** .084*** 
L.releases2 -6.4e-04*** -5.1e-04*** -7.0e-04*** 
L.bugs_fixed .01*** .01*** .01*** 
L.log_cu .45*** .45*** .45*** 
L.age -.0019*** -.0019*** -.0019*** 
L.age2 1.9e-07*** 1.9e-07*** 1.9e-07*** 
                                                    
2
 Among the 15 categories, Games/Entertainment, Editors, File Sharing, and Chat are classified as low cost categories. 
L.relXcost 
 
-.076*** 
 
L.relXuser 
  
.021** 
Observations 89114 89114 89114 
R-squared 0.3870 0.3876 0.3871 
categories 1092 1092 1092 
="* p<0.10  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01" 
Table 2.  Effect of Release Strategy and Adoption Cost 
4.2 Community Contributions and OSS Licenses 
We now turn to the influence of release frequency strategy under community contributions, most 
closely related to Hypotheses 2 to 3. The results are presented in Table 3. Controlling the level of 
community contributions, we find that release frequency have a positive effect ( 0.01p < ) under 
strong community contributions and negative effect ( 0.01p < ) under weak community contributions 
(Column (1) and (2) in Table 3), which supports our H2. This suggests that if the project has strong 
community contributions, releasing early and often may help with the download market share. 
Otherwise, it might have opposite impact.  
 
 
_ jtlog mktshare  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Highly 
Restrictive 
Less 
Restrictive 
L.releases .15*** .086*** .086*** .073*** .16*** 
L.releases2 -5.8e-04*** -5.8e-04*** -5.8e-04*** -4.8e-04*** -.0057*** 
L.bugs_fixed .0064*** .0064*** .0064*** -3.6e-04 .017*** 
L.log_cu .45*** .45*** .45*** .45*** .44*** 
L.age -.0019*** -.0019*** -.0019*** -.002*** -.0016*** 
L.age2 1.9e-07*** 1.9e-07*** 1.9e-07*** 2.2e-07*** 1.4e-07*** 
L.weak_comm -.073*** 
    
L.relXweak -.062*** 
    
L.strong_comm 
 
.073*** .072*** .083*** .036** 
L.relXstrong 
 
.062*** .023 .098*** .02 
L.relXstrongXhr 
  
.069** 
  
Observations 89114 89114 89114 55611 33503 
R-squared 0.3879 0.3879 0.3880 0.3943 0.3839 
projects 1092 1092 1092 697 395 
="* p<0.10  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01" 
Table 3.  Effect of Community Contributions & License 
Column (3) in Table 3 presents the results related to OSS license. We further interact the  term 
releasesjt×strong_commjt with the highly restrictive dummy, it turns out the total effect of 
releasesjt×strong_commjt (relXstrong) is only significantly positive in projects with highly restrictive 
licenses. For projects with less restrictive licenses, this effect is not significant. This means even when 
the community contributions are strong, the motivations of the contributors still matter. Releasing fast 
seems to work when the license is restrictive. To confirm this, we run the regression in the subsample 
of projects with highly restrictive license. The results are presented in the last two columns of Table 3. 
In the restrictive subsample, the moderate effect is significant while in the less restrictive subsample 
we do not see significant effect of the interaction term. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Using a unique longitudinal data set, we test the effect of release strategy on download market share of 
OSS projects, and investigated the moderation effect of adoption cost, community contributions, and 
OSS license. Our empirical results show the importance of community contributions and the license 
type of the project in shaping the effect of release strategies.  
The software release strategy literature and the wisdom in the OSS community both indicate that fast 
and frequent releases would benefit the project. While we found that release frequency is positively 
associated with download market share, the relationship is not linear. Releasing too frequently may not 
only not product a significant positive benefit but also have a negative effect on the download market 
share.  
We analyze the reasons from the demand and the supply sides of the OSS production process. From 
the demand side, users of OSS incur costs while adopting the new releases. If a project releases too 
frequently, the accumulated adoption cost may offset the benefit from quality improvement. This 
would leave the project in a worse position in competition. 
From the supply side, we consider the co-creation of software product by the OSS team and the 
community. We find that community contributions have a moderate effect on the effect of release 
frequency. When community contributions are weak, frequent releases might have a negative 
moderate effect on download market share. Two reasons may be behind this result. First, as the release 
frequency increases, the project team has less time to incorporate the community contributions. 
Therefore the quality that the project gets from the community contributions actually decreases, which 
leads to lower market share. Second, as the team speeds up the release frequency, the community 
might not be able to keep up with the fast release iterations. Even though they still contribute, the 
contribution quality actually decreases. Therefore, releasing too fast may backfire. 
We find that OSS license plays an important role in this process. The moderate effect of community 
contributions may depend on the license type of the project. Even when contributions are strong, 
releasing often may only help when the license is highly restrictive. We interpret this result from the 
motivations of contributors in OSS. When the license is highly restrictive (like GPL), the team has to 
contribute any derivatives back to the community if they incorporate the codes from the community. 
Therefore, the community members have no concerns of their codes been hijacked. If the license is 
less restrictive (like BSD), the community may have concerns and thus releasing fast might not help 
receivecommunity contributions. 
Overall, our results contribute to a richer understanding of the OSS project management process. We 
expect that our work will result in more research in this exciting area and lead to improvements in 
open source software practice.  
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